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International Money Laundering: 
Research and Investigation Join Forces 
by Barbara Webster and Michael S. McCampbell 
The money laundering 
industry 
In the summer of 1991, perhaps only the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union received 
greater national media attention than the 
shutdown of the Bank of Commerce and 
Credit International (BCCI) by regulators 
in several countries. BCCI was convicted 
of money laundering in Tampa, Florida. In 
~ddition, BCCI has, as part of a global plea 
greement, pled guilty in the District of 
Columbia to conspiracy to commit rack-
eteering acts involving money laundering, 
fraud, and tax evasion, and in New York to 
charges of money laundering, fraud, brib-
ery, and theft. 
The bank has been called "the most perva-
sive money-laundering operation and 
financial supermarket ever created,"1 a 
"marathon swindle,"2 and a "steering serv-
ice for [Colombian] drug traffickers to 
deposit hundreds of millions of contraband 
dollars outside the country."3 Currently the 
From the Director 
Financial schemes such as money launder-
ing enable white-collar and organized 
crime offenders to divert billions of dollars 
each year from the Nation's economy and 
spend their illegally earned profits with 
relative impunity. As money laundering 
strategies become more sophisticated in 
design and international in scope, regula-
tory and law enforcement agencies at all 
levels of government need more advanced 
methods to prevent and control these 
offenses. 
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has 
conducted a national assessment to evalu-
target of investigations in several coun-
tries, BCCI will surely rank as one of the 
most complex schemes of its kind. Even 
so, BCCI is only one example of the perva-
sive, worldwide money laundering indus-
try that exists today. 
It is probably impossible to determine how 
much money is laundered either domesti-
cally or internationally each year. One way 
to gain some perspective on the problem is 
to consider estimates of drug trafficking 
revenues. Worldwide, people spend as 
much as $500 billion annually on illegal 
drugs, with up to $200 billion spent in the 
United States.4 
According to the U.S. Depattment of the 
Treasury, drug traffickers launder an esti-
mated $100 billion each year in this coun-
try alone,5 with much of the activity 
channeled through financial institutions. 
Although drug trafficking fuels the money 
laundering industry, any assessment of the 
problem must also consider the funds 
laundered from other crimes, including 
ate the methods currently employed to combat 
money laundering in the United States. This 
assessment examined the enforcement strate-
gies of experienced Federal investigators and 
prosecutors, and served as the first step in the 
development of guidelines for State and local 
officials to choose money laundering responses 
that are consistent with their needs andre-
sources. Since their publication, these guide-
lines have served numerous State and local law 
enforcement agencies in their drug trafficking 
investigations. 
In November 1991, NIJ and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) cosponsored a confer-
fraud offenses, securities manipulation, 
illegal gambling, bribery, extortion, tax 
evasion, illegal arms sales, political pay-
offs, and terrorism. When these crimes are 
also considered, estimates of the amount of 
money laundered annually run as high as 
$300 billion.6 
International conference: new 
directions for the National 
Institute of Justice 
In the past decade, drug trafficking and 
money laundering operations have become 
more profitable, more pervasive, and more 
sophisticated. Colombian drug cartels and 
other climinal organizations operate easily 
across international borders, forming joint 
ventures and limited partnerships among 
themselves and with other groups. They 
also have access to top legal and financial 
advisers. Investigations of money launder-
ing and other financial crimes have proved 
an especially productive way to identify 
ence on emerging economic crimes. The 
conference served both to train FBI offi-
cials in the complexities of international 
money laundering cases and to pave the 
way for future research. 
This conference and NIJ's ongoing re-
search demonstrate our continued commit-
ment to aiding those on the front lines in 
the battle against drug trafficking and 
organized crime. 
Charles B. DeWitt 
Director 
National Institute of Justice 
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and incapacitate high-level operatives in 
these criminal organizations. The National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) is committed to 
supporting these enforcement efforts by 
developing responsive research on money 
laundering and other financial crimes. 
Acting on this commitment, the Institute 
recently broke new ground by cosponsor-
ing a conference on international money 
laundering with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). The conference was a 
milestone, representing the first time NIJ 
and the FBI had coordinated an interna-
tional training program. Law enforcement 
representatives from 18 jurisdictions (see 
exhibit 1) attended the conference, which 
was held in Washington, D.C., in May 
1991. Other participants included legal 
attaches assigned to U.S. embassies in 15 
countries, and Institute staff involved in 
money laundering research. 
In his opening address, NIJ Director 
Charles B. DeWitt stressed that "this con-
ference is the first in a continuing dialog 
between the Institute, the FBI, and foreign 
law enforcement to discuss problems fac-
ing the international law enforcement 
community and to draw from this dialog a 
research agenda." The FBI also expressed 
high expectations: FBI Deputy Assistant 
Director Robert Bryant challenged the 
conference participants to set a goal of 
seizing $100 million each month world-
wide from criminal organizations. 
The conference provided a forum for com-
paring laws and investigative practices that 
relate to international money laundering. 
This report draws from conference presen-
tations and other sources to discuss tech-
niques that are frequently part of the 
international money laundering process. 
Included are brief case studies of complex 







of Federal and State laws designed to 
attack money laundering, the results of a 
special conference session on research 
priorities, and an overview of current NIJ 
research initiatives on money laundering 
and financial crime. 
Federal money laundering 
laws 
The Attorney General of the United States 
defines money laundering as "all activities 
designed to conceal the existence, nature, 
and final disposition of funds gained 
through illicit activities."7 The money 
laundering process may simply be mailing 
a box of cash out of the country, or it may 
include schemes complex enough to lead 
to bank takeovers. Many of the techniques 
that launderers use would be perfectly 
legal business transactions if the source of 
the cash were not tainted. As the Presi-
dent's Commission on Organized Crime 
stated in 1984, "a new lexicon-including 
phrases like wire transfer, bank-to-bank 
transfer, CTR [currency transaction re-
port], CMIR [currency and monetary in-
strument report]; shell corporation, margin 
account, and letter of credit-has moved 
from Wall Street to the back street.'>R 
Money laundering per se did not become 
a Federal crime in the United States until 
the passage of the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-570, 
100 Stat. 3207-18). Until that time, the 
main tools for combating money launder-
ing were provided in the Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970. (See 31 U .S.C. §§ 5311-
5326.) 
The Bank Secrecy Act requires (among 
other things) that financial institutions file 
CTR 's on all cash transactions of more 
than $10,000. CTR's must be filed with the 
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Internal Revenue Service within 15 days ol. 
the transaction, and the financial institution 
must keep copies of them for 5 years. The 
reports require specific information about 
customers' identities. In addition, CMIR's 
must be filed for cash or certain monetary 
instruments exceeding $10,000 in value 
that enter or leave the United States. 
The Bank Secrecy Act can help authorities 
flag the movement of illegally acquired 
cash through financial institutions and 
across international borders. But the very 
inclusion of a specific dollar amount has 
provided an obvious way to skirt the law: 
money launderers could simply make 
multiple transactions in amounts less than 
$10,000 ($9,500, for example). This prac-
tice, known as "smurfing," is now illegal 
(31 u.s.c. § 5324 ). 
Transacting business in the name of a retail 
firm, real or bogus, that has been granted a 
bank exemption from the CTR require-
ment, can avoid the CTR requirement. Still 
another possibility is to make several small 
deposits and only one large deposit (which 
often does not alert Federal officials). 
Bribing bank officials is yet another way to 
circumvent CTR problems. Finally, the 
ultimate solution to CTR entanglements is 
to establish or gain controlling interest in a 
bank. 
Until the early 1980's, compliance with 
CTR reporting requirements was lax and 
penalties for noncompliance were lenient. 
The President's 1984 Commission on 
Organized Crime illustrated this problem 
in a lengthy discussion of the Eduardo 
Orozco case. From 1978 to 1982, Orozco 
laundered approximately $151 million in 
cocaine and heroin money through 18 bank 
and currency exchange accounts in New 
York City. He frequently delivered the 
money to financial institutions in card-
board boxes. In one instance, a single 
deposit totaled $3.4 million in cash. In 
interviews with Commission members, 
representatives of four banks said they 
were uncertain whether they could or 
would report such suspicious transactions 
to law enforcement, and were not sure 
which Federal agency should be 
contacted. 
The Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986 created two new offenses related to 
money laundering and currency transactior, 
reporting violations. It generally prohibits 
i 1) engaging in financial transactions and 
international transportations or transfers of 
funds or property derived from "specified 
unlawful activity" (18 U.S.C. § 1956), and 
(2) engaging in monetary transactions in 
excess of $10,000 with property derived 
from proceeds of "specified unlawful 
activity" (18 U.S.C. § 1957). In addition, 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 prohibit-
ed the structuring of currency transactions 
to evade the CTR reporting requirement 
(31 U.S.C. § 5324). Also, these offenses 
and certain violations of the Title 31 cur-
rency reporting requirements (such as 
CTR' s and CMIR' s) are now predicate 
acts under the Racketeer-Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute (18 
u.s.c. §§ 1961-1968). 
Other weapons against money laundering 
include the forfeiture provisions of§§ 981 
and 982 of Title 18, which provide for civil 
and criminal forfeiture, respectively, for 
violations of the money laundering stat-
utes, and 26 U.S.C. § 60501, which re-
quires any person engaged in a trade or 
business who receives more than $10,000 
in cash in a single transaction or related 
'Tansactions to file a form with the Internal 
.{evenue Service within 15 days of the 
payment. 
Criminal penalties for violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 may be as high as a 20-year 
prison term and a fine of up to $500,000 or 
twice the value of the property involved, 
whichever is greater. Criminal penalties for 
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 may be as 
high as a 10-year term of imprisonment 
and a fine under the provisions of Title 18 
(18 U.S.C. § 3571) or, alternatively, a fine 
of up to twice the value of the criminally 
derived property. Violations of the anti-
structuring statute (31 U.S.C. § 5324) 
may bring a fine of up to $250,000 and 
5 years in prison or, in some cases, a fine 
of up to $500,000 and 10 years in prison 
[31 U.S.C. § 5322 (a)-(b)]. 
The Money Laundering Prosecution Im-
provement Act of 1988 included a provi-
sion authorizing the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury to require financial institu-
tions to verify the identity of persons who 
purchase bank checks, traveler's checks, or 
money orders in amounts of $3,000 or 
more. This Act also authorized the Secre-
rry of the Treasury to target certain types 
of institutions or geographic areas for 
special reporting requirements. (See 31 
U.S.C. §§ 5325-5326.) 
Money laundering laws in 
other countries 
Law enforcement often operates in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty when dealing 
with international money laundering cases. 
At the time of the conference, the status 
and nature of money laundering legislation 
varied widely from country to country. For 
example, Mexico, Colombia, and Thailand 
had no money laundering laws at all. Spain 
was drafting such legislation, and France 
had a money laundering law that prohib-
ited only drug-related money laundering. 
Switzerland no longer has the strictest 
banking secrecy laws in Europe. In August 
1990, two new provisions in the Swiss 
criminal code became effective; one is 
specifically related to money laundering, 
the other is concerned with the lack of 
vigilance in the area of financial transac-
tions. Yet despite provisions for new 
criminal penalties, Switzerland-like 
many countries-must rely heavily on the 
self-regulation of banks and other financial 
institutions.9 
To foster productive bilateral and multilat-
eral investigations, the United States has 
entered into many types of treaties with 
foreign governments. Mutual legal assist-
ance treaties (MLAT's) enable law en-
forcement authorities to obtain evidence, 
exchange documents; and make requests 
for search and seizure and asset forfeiture. 
MLAT's also permit the IRS, under strictly 
defined circumstances, to obtain testimony, 
financial information, and bank records 
needed to investigate international money 
launderers and drug traffickers. In addition, 
the United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances has been ratified by 
more than 60 countries. The Convention, 
among other things, obligates parties to 
make money laundering an extraditable 
offense. 10 
In addition to entering into treaties with 
foreign governments, the United States is 
participating in several multilateral organi-
zations and programs to combat interna-
tional money laundering. The United 
States is currently participating in the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
which was convened in 1989 by the G-7 
Economic Summit with a mandate to study 
measures to prevent the use of financial 
institutions by money launderers and to 
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improve cooperation in money laundering 
cases. FA TF currently consists of 26 coun-
tries, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the 
Commission of the European Communi-
ties. The task force has formulated 40 
recommendations to assist countries in 
combating money laundering, and is in the 
process of evaluating members' progress in 
implementing these recommendations. The 
United States also participated in an Ex-
perts Group on Money Laundering and 
Asset Forfeiture convened by the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) in Novem-
ber 1990 to draft model money laundering 
and asset forfeiture statutes. On May 22, 
1992, OAS adopted the model legislation 
and recommended it to the member States 
for incorporation into their national legisla-
tion. The United States is participating 
in OAS efforts to promulgate the model 
legislation. 
Major steps in the international 
money laundering process 
Drug traffickers, regardless of how their 
organizations are structured, generally have 
at least three objectives in common: (1) pay 
expenses to suppliers, distributors, and 
various support personnel; (2) reinvest in 
the illegal enterprise; and (3) use proceeds 
to ensure financial security and a luxurious 
lifestyle. In addition, it is important to some 
criminals to achieve legitimate status in 
business. This acquired legitimacy not only 
aids in hiding illegal funds and activities, 
but also can serve as a springboard for 
political influence and corruption. 
At the conference, FBI representatives 
discussed the role of money laundering in 
achieving these objectives. They described 
international money laundering as a process 
that generally inoves through three phases. 
The first phase involves removing illegally 
obtained money from the United States and 
placing it into foreign accounts. This action 
may take the form of physically removing 
money via couriers, mail, and various 
smuggling ploys, or it may involve elec-
tronic transfers of funds from one financial 
institution to another. 
The second phase involves legitimizing the 
"dirty" money so that it appears to be de-
rived from legal sources. The laundering 
may be accomplished by moving funds into 
foreign bank or securities accounts, creat-
ing foreign dummy corporations to receive 
and disburse funds, making foreign real 
Exhibit 2. The Pizza Connection 
This case, which was investigated by the FBI in the early 1980's, involved the smug-
gling and distribution of heroin from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle by various 
elements of the Sicilian Mafia. The proceeds from east coast heroin sales were col-
lected from pizza parlors in Queens, New York. The money was then deposited in 
commodities accounts held by New York City brokerage firms. Frequently, cash was 
transported to the bank in gym bags and suitcases. In addition, some of the cash, 
usually in denominations of $5, $1 0, and $20 bills, was transported out of the country 
from New York City to Bermuda on private jets. The money was then wire-transferred 
from New York and Bermuda to Switzerland. From Switzerland it was wired to Italy, 
where it was used to buy more heroin. 
The FBI and Federal prosecutors believe at least $25.4 million was laundered in this 
case between 1980 and 1982. In 1984, 38 individuals were indicted as a result of the 
investigation. 
estate investments, and employing other 
techniques. During this phase, the money 
may be used to pay operating expenses for 
the illegal business. 
The money laundering process then may or 
may not enter a third phase, where activi-
ties center around repatriating the funds, or 
sending them back to the United States. 
Once back in this country, the money can 
be used for legitimate transactions or 
further criminal activity (e.g., drug traf-
ficking). Loans from foreign banks or 
corporations, letters of credit payments, 
consulting fees, phony leases or services, 
and excessive payments for goods or serv-
ices are a few of the techniques used to 
repatriate the illegal funds under a cloak 
of legitimacy. 
Despite the complexity of some money 
laundering schemes, they are not impen-
etrable-as the case studies in this report 
demonstrate. Although drug kingpins may 
effectively insulate themselves from street-
level drug retailers, they seldom place the 
same distance between themselves and 
their money. Money launderers are par-
ticularly vulnerable at the points where 
they intersect with legitimate businesses 
and begin to create paper trails. 
Removing money from the 
country 
Although some criminals have been 
known to bury containers of cash in their 
backyards, 11 the money laundering process 
frequently begins with the conversion of 
U.S. "street drug" money-in $5,$10, and 
$20 bills-into a more usable and less 
visible form. 
One option is to use smugglers to physically 
move the cash from the United States to 
another country with lax banking regula-
tions or strict bank secrecy laws. In the 
Pizza Connection case (see exhibit 2), pri-
vate jets were used to take drug cash, still in 
the form of small bills, from New York City 
to Bermuda. In a 1983 Florida case, law 
enforcement authorities estimated that one 
pilot had smuggled more than $145 million 
out of the country over an 8-month period. 12 
U.S. Customs agents caught him as his 
Learjet attempted to leave for Panama with 
more than $5 million in cash on board. 
Smuggling cash via commercial container 
ships, trucks, or aircraft is another technique 
that has proved successful. Operation 
Greenback in the Southern District of 
Florida investigated an organization that 
exported millions of dollars in cash con-
cealed in electrical appliances. 13 Operation 
Polar Cap (see exhibit 3) investigated an 
operation that involved flying boxes of cash 
labeled as jewelry from New York to Los 
Angeles. 
While some smugglers in a hurry may re-
move drug cash from the country "as is" in 
small bills, other situations require the ex-
change of the small-denomination U.S. bills 
for larger bills, cashier's checks, money 
orders, traveler's checks, or similar nego-
tiable instruments. The process is simple: 
the money launderer receives the street 
money, then hires any number of persons to 
make the exchanges at different banks, post 
offices, check cashing services, and other 
establishments. Atlantic City casinos, for 
example, were the banks of choice for Balti-
more heroin wholesaler Maurice "Peanut" 
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King, who used cashier's checks issued by. 
casinos to open an investment account 
with a Baltimore-based securities firm. 14 
Once the small bills are converted, the 
large bills, cashier's checks, or other in-
struments may be sent out of the United 
States by mail, commercial shipping or 
aircraft, or courier. As a relatively minor 
example, U.S. Customs agents, during one 
preboarding passenger check of a Miami to 
Bogota flight, discovered a woman carry-
ing several cashier's checks that amounted 
to less than $10,000 each but that totaled 
more than $40,000. Another $40,000 in 
cash was found, some sewn into the lining 
of her purse and some taped under her 
arms. Is 
Electronic funds transfers. An alternative 
to physically removing money from the 
country is to deposit the cash, then transfer 
the funds electronically to other domestic 
and foreign banks, financial institutions, or 
securities accounts. Swiss law enforcement 
officials report that when money is trans-
ferred by wire to Switzerland, it seldom 
comes directly from the country of origin; 
rather it is "prewashed" in a third country 
such as Panama, the Bahamas, the Caymar 
Islands, or Luxembourg. 16 
The case of money launderer Hernan 
Botero illustrates how money was laun-
dered by bribing U.S. bank officers to 
accept and wire hundreds of thousands of 
dollars a day. In late 1979, Botero told 
officers of the Landmark First National 
Bank in Plantation, Florida, that he needed 
to remove cash from the United States 
quickly and deposit it into Colombian 
banks without the knowledge of U.S. au-
thorities. Botero opened five accounts, 
using false passport identification numbers 
and forged signature cards. He stated his 
intent to deposit approximately $400,000 
cash each day of the banking month. For a 
commission of three-quarters of 1 percent, 
bank officials either failed to file or failed 
to prepare CTR's on deposits for Botero's 
organization. They also wired the funds to 
other banks, usually the Pan American 
Bank or the Bankers Trust Company in 
Miami. Later, Botero's people switched to 
obtaining cashier's checks, which were 
mailed to various banks via Postal Service 
Express Mail. 17 
In another case, drug traffickers in 1980 
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and 1981 bribed officers of the Great 
American Bank in Miami to perform simi-
.r services and laundered $94 million over 
a period of 13 months. 18 In the Pizza Con-
nection case involving a laundering opera-
tion run by Sicilian Mafia members, vast 
sums of heroin and cocaine profits were 
transferred from established New York 
banks to Switzerland and Italy (see exhibit 
2). Another variation on the use of wire 
transfers is to make single large deposits in 
rural U.S. banks, transfer the funds by wire 
to a central account, then transfer the 
whole amount again in a single transac-
tion.19 Operation Cash Crop (see exhibit 4) 
uncovered this technique, among others. 
Bank-to-bank transfers of illegal funds can 
also be accomplished easily with the com-
plicity of bank officials. The bank transfers 
funds by wire between its own (rather than 
a customer's) account and accounts in 
correspondent banks, making the launder-
ir ~ of personal funds appear as legitimate 
bank business. Without other leads, bank-
to-bank transfers of illegally obtained 
funds are almost impossible to distinguish 
from normal banking transactions. Further-
more, the sheer volume of all wire trans-
fers made and the speed with which they 
re accomplished, make it extremely diffi-
"ult to trace these funds or document their 
illegal nature. A major bank in New York, 
for example, reportedly handles about 
40,000 wire transfers each business day; 
the average transfer totals $3 million.20 
Currency exchanges. Another way to 
move drug money out of the United States 
is by using casas de cambia, money-
changing houses found throughout the 
South American countries and Mexico, 
along the border between Texas and 
Mexico, and in Houston, Texas. The casas 
were virtually unknown and unregulated 
10 years ago. When commercial banks 
increased their compliance with CTR 
requirements, and when U.S. law enforce-
ment began vigorously applying asset 
forfeiture laws, many drug traffickers 
began taking their money to the casas.21 
The casas pool many customers' funds in 
their own accounts in U.S. or foreign 
banks and keep their own records of the 
amounts owed to each customer. When a 
foreign drug trafficker wants to send 
money to his own country, the cas a opera-
tor wires the funds from its bank to the 
afficker's foreign account(s). Even when 
d U.S. bank completes a CTR, it names the 
casa as the owner of the funds, not the 
actual owner. In the Houston area, giro 
Exhibit 3. Operation Polar Cap 
In March 1989, Federal agents with search warrants seized three boxes of docu-
ments from the New York City branch of Continental Illinois Bank. This seizure was 
the culmination of a 2-year investigation that broke up a Colombian Medellin cartel 
money laundering organization operating in Europe, South America, and the United 
States.23 
Colombian cocaine manufactured by the Medellin cartel was sold on the streets of 
New York. The cash from these sales was packed in boxes, labeled as jewelry, and 
delivered by armored car to La Guardia Airport for shipment to Los Angeles. 
The money was then delivered to nearby banks and deposited as if it were the pro-
ceeds of jewelry sales. It was then transferred by wire back to New York banks. 
These unsuspecting banks wired the money to accounts in other New York banks. 
The money was then transferred by wire to banks in Colombia.24 
During the first phase of the investigation, 127 persons were arrested. A Federal 
grand jury in Atlanta returned indictments against two South American banks, charg-
ing involvement in laundering more than $300 million in drug proceeds in the United 
States. In the most recent phase, as of November 25, 1991, 50 persons in 5 States 
were charged with operating a coast-to-coast ring. So far, more than $10 million in 
cash and bank accounts has been seized. 
(wire) houses are found in addition to the 
casas. In general, the giros move drug 
money to Colombia, while the casas move 
Mexican drug money.22 
Arizona and Texas have recently enacted 
laws to license casas. 
Legitimizing and repatriating 
illegal funds 
After the illegal funds have been removed 
from the United States, the second phase of 
money laundering begins. This second 
phase involves legitimizing the income 
from illegal sources so that it appears to be 
the product of legal business or personal 
transactions. The legitimizing process 
continues into the third money laundering 
phase, when funds are repatriated and 
invested in businesses and in personal and 
real property back in the United States. In 
some instances, the principals may will-
ingly pay taxes on their profits (or file 
returns that use allowable deductions to 
avoid taxes). In other situations, complete 
avoidance of taxes is an important 
objective. 
Using tax havens. The operation of the 
Perlowin Organization provides one ex-
ample of an illegal enterprise that was 
strongly motivated to avoid the IRS. The 
organization, headed by Bruce Perlowin, 
was a large international marijuana-
importing group based in California and 
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Florida. Theodore Koury and Charles W. 
Broun, Jr., were financial advisers to the 
organization, helping it conceal its drug 
profits by establishing numerous bank 
accounts, corpqrations, trusts, and other 
entities throughout the United States and in 
foreign countries. Many of these entities 
were established in the Cayman Islands, 
the Netherlands Antilles, and Luxembourg, 
where strict bank secrecy laws effectively 
prohibited scrutiny of the accounts by law 
enforcement agencies. Eventually, the 
funds in these accounts were wired back to 
the United States to a corporation con-
trolled by the Perlowin Organization. The 
incoming funds were shown on the books 
of the corporation as loans from a foreign 
company or bank. Perlowin eventually . ' 
forfeited to the U.S. Government a home 
in California valued at $3.4 million as well 
as his interests in more than 20 foreign and 
domestic corporations, trust accounts, and 
other entities. 25 
Operation Cash Crop (see exhibit 4) offers 
another example of how money can be 
channeled through foreign corporations. 
Finally, the BCCI case currently under 
investigation reveals a tangled conspiracy 
involving offshore banks, shell corpora-
tions, holding companies, bank takeovers, 
and an international cast of thousands. 
Domestic business ventures. In the third 
phase of international money laundering, 
Exhibit 4. Operation Cash Crop 
The case focused on the Juan Jose Qulntero-Payan organization centered In 
Guadalajara, Mexico, and the Juan Frank Garcia organization centered in Texas. 
Quintero was the Mexican source, Garcia the wholesale Texas customer. From Texas, 
these drugs were distributed throughout the United States. This RICO enterprise used 
propane tanker trucks, airplanes, and tractor trailers to move its drugs from Mexico to 
Texas at a rate of 250,000 pounds a year. 
The milllors of dollars generated by this organization were laundered in three ways: (1) 
smurfing the money into banks using the $9,500 deposit or check purchase scheme; (2) 
loan laundering, whereby huge amounts of currency became collateral for huge loans, the 
proceeds of which were passed through another account to become cashiers' checks. 
then used to buy land 400 miles away; and (3) the international laundry, where huge 
sums of money we(e deposited in various banks in Texas and California, then collected in 
a single bank, converted to cashier's checks, carried to the Cayman Islands and used to 
establish two shell corporations, and then transferred back to the United States in the 
names of the shell companies. 
The investigation took about 3 years to complete, and resulted in the indictment of about 
100 people, corporations, banks, and bankers in Federal and Texas courts. About $30 
million in assets have been seized, the crown jewel of which was $6.8 million from a 
single bank. At the time of this seizure It was, and may still be, the largest single seizure 
of drug-related bank accounts in the history of the country. Massive multidecade sen-
tences were assessed against the numerous persons convicted, the longest being 50 
years without parole. 
illegally acquired funds may be imported 
from their foreign resting places and ma-
nipulated through U.S. businesses and 
financial institutions. 
Real estate transactions offer excellent 
money laundering opportunities. For ex-
ample, for a property worth $3 million, a 
money launderer offers to pay the seller $2 
million in a visible transaction and $1 
million under the table in cash. The laun-
derer then sells the property for the fair 
market value of $3 million. The $1 million 
"profit" that the launderer makes is really 
only the drug cash that has been cycled 
through the deal. He can now pay (or 
avoid) taxes on this profit and achieve an 
aura of legitimacy. 
In a different scenario, the launderer pays 
$2 million for a property, which represents 
fair market value. He then proceeds to sell 
the property. He finds a buyer and gives 
that buyer $1 million. The buyer then pays 
$3 million for the property ($2 million 
representing fair market value plus the $1 
million that the launderer has just given 
him). Again, the launderer shows a "profit" 
on which taxes may be paid or avoided. 
But this time the transaction has artificially 
inflated the value of the property, priming 
the next buyer to overpay and leaving any 
legitimate lender vulnerable. Such schemes 
not only effectively launder illicit funds, 
but can also have devastating effects on a 
community's real estate market. 
The real estate development process also 
offers many opportunities to launder 
money. For example, a launderer buys a 
piece of land worth $1 million and openly 
contracts for $4 million in improvements. 
He th~n secretly pays another $2 million in 
cash (drug money) for further improve-
ments to contractors who want to avoid 
taxes. If the launderer sells the property for 
the $7 million he has now invested, he pays 
(or avoids) taxes on his apparent profit (the 
$2 million in drug money) and appears to 
be conducting legitimate business.26 
The descriptions above are relatively 
simple: they do not reflect the other illegal 
activities that may come into play in such 
deals. These include obtaining false titles, 
arranging false credit, and securing false 
loans from foreign and domestic financial 
institutions and corporations. The deals 
may also involve purchases by and sales to 
"straw," or phony, corporations or indi-
viduals. Finally, money launderers may 
bribe bank officers, appraisers, public 
officials, or virtually anyone in a position 
to move funds or otherwise influence the 
outcomes of these transactions. 
6 
Other investments preferred by money 
launderers are businesses that commonly 
deal in cash and have relatively fixed oper-
ating costs. Import/export firms, bars and 
restaurants, movie theaters, travel agencies, 
and various service businesses meet these 
requirements. Money may be laundered by 
overstating cash receipts, selling fictitious 
goods or services to an accomplice, prepar-
ing false bills of lading, paying "ghost" 
employees, and many other ploys. FBI 
speakers at the conference discussed the 
Lavin case at length to illustrate some of 
these techniques (see exhibit 5). 
SeHing research priorities 
To elicit recommendations for research on 
international money laundering, NIJ spon-
sored a special discussion group at the 
May 1991 international money laundering 
conference. Participants were encouraged 
to interpret the term "research" broadly 
when considering their needs, and to in-
clude policy and legal analyses as well as 
other problem-solving methods. They were 
also asked to focus on issues related to 
laws and regulations and cooperation be-
tween law enforcement and financial 
institutions. 
Laws and regulations. To spur the discus-
sion, participating countries were asked 
whether it would be helpful to receive, as a 
research product, the annotated text of a 
model money laundering statute. Most 
participants felt consensus on a model law 
would probably not be possible because of 
the diversity of legal traditions and legisla-
tive obstacles in the various countries. 
Further, many foreign representatives were 
concerned that the notion of a model law 
might actually be offensive to countries 
whose legal and cultural traditions have a 
history of incompatibility with U.S. or 
Western European law. 
However, a number of participants recom-
mended constructive alternatives to a 
model law. They agreed that a more useful 
research product would be a compendium 
that featured the experiences of various 
countries, discussed recent enforcement 
and compliance experiences, and presented 
an analysis of resources needed to effec-
tively implement the measures described. 
These resources might include the number 
and specializations of additional personnel 
needed (such as financial analysts), in-
service training curriculums for existing 
;rsonnel, the development of bank trans-
action reporting data bases, and sample 
protocols for law enforcement to use in 
working with banks. 
Law enforcement cooperation with 
financial institutions. To begin discussion 
of this issue, participants were asked 
whether it would be helpful to encourage 
financial institutions in their countries to 
provide information to law enforcement 
authorities on suspicious financial transac-
tions. It was suggested that one way to do 
this might be to offer positive inducements 
for voluntary cooperation. For example, 
the U.S. Money Laundering Act exempts 
banks from privacy law penalties when 
they voluntarily contact the IRS with leads 
on suspicious transactions. 
Participants expressed a strong interest in 
research on ways to foster optimum coop-
eration between law enforcement and 
financial institutions. However, since a 
number of participants noted that their 
countries already had laws facilitating 
bank cooperation, the group directed the 
discussion toward other approaches. Of 
--articular interest was the concept of cross-
aining banking and law enforcement 
personnel. The group consensus was that a 
study of such efforts should focus on train-
ing financial personnel about regulatory 
compliance and the provision of investiga-
tive leads, and should educate law enforce-
ment personnel about banking operations. 
Several efforts to provide cross-training in 
other countries were noted. In England, the 
police, the British Bankers' Association, 
and the Building Societies Association (a 
savings and loan) have developed a com-
prehensive set of guidelines for banks to 
follow in cases where they suspect money 
laundering by account holders. The guide-
lines cover all banking and deposit activi-
ties of financial institutions in the United 
Kingdom. An appendix to the guidelines 
gives several examples of money launder-
ing techniques and provides a form for 
reporting suspicious activity. 
In Canada and Germany, increased coop-
eration is also being achieved by cross-
training police and bank officers to better 
understand money laundering detection 
and related problems. The Canadian model 
wolves temporary assignments of bank 
<'ersonnel to police agencies. In the United 
States, there has been some cross-training 
of bank personnel by the IRS. However, 
Exhibit 5. Dr. Snow 
This case involved a 60-kilogram-per-year cocaine distribution network. Headquartered 
in Philadelphia, the drug ring was headed by a 26-year-old dentist, Larry Lavin {nick-
named "Dr. Snow"). Lavin came to the FBI's attention in 1982 during a bankruptcy fraud 
investigation of an entrepreneur named Mark Stewart. Stewart had nearly 40 busi-
nesses, including a sports arena, a recording company, and a record promotion com-
pany {Larmark, for Larry and Mark). The arena paid Lavin a $25,000 salary, and many 
of the other businesses frequently issued checks to Lavin and some of his accomplices. 
Lavin began dealing drugs in college. Before he graduated from dental school, he was 
netting about $60,000 a month in cocaine profits and had started using Stewart to laun-
der money. Lavin continued to expand his drug empire for the next few years, at the 
same time investing in real estate and antique furniture, playing the stock market, living 
an extravagant lifestyle, and operating a small dental practice. 
By the time he was indicted in 1984 under the "drug kingpin" statute, Lavin had person-
ally reaped an estimated $6 million from his drug operations. After his indictment, he 
fled to Virginia Beach, Virginia, where he created false identities and purchased real 
estate, a boat, and mutual funds. He was caught 18 months later, in 1986. The case 
resulted in 83 indictments and 83 convictions on numerous Federal charges. Lavin was 
sentenced to 22 years after pleading guilty to five counts of drug conspiracy, andre-
ceived a 20-year sentence for tax evasion.27 
very few State and local law enforcement 
agencies in the United States have partici-
pated in cross-training efforts with person-
nel from financial institutions. 
Future research objectives 
NU is currently sponsoring a national as-
sessment of methods to effectively combat 
money laundering in the United States.28 
Although the assessment does not have an 
international focus, the research will lay a 
foundation for broader studies by address-
ing the following key issues: 
• The nature and patterns of money laun-
dering offenses, characteristics of offend-
ers, and circumstances that facilitate the 
occurrence of these offenses. 
• The means by which regulatory and 
criminal justice agencies ensure the com-
pliance of financial institutions with 
money laundering statutes. 
• Effective Federal, State, and local 
enforcement approaches for detecting, 
investigating, and prosecuting money 
laundering crimes. 
• Effective means to gain the cooper-
ation of law enforcement agencies in dif-
ferent countries in money laundering 
investigations. 
A developmental FBI conference on 
emerging economic crimes in November 
7 
1991 was valuable to the Institute in devel-
oping its research agenda. The Institute is 
also exploring ways to improve coopera-
tion between law enforcement and the 
banking industry, and may hold another 
developmental conference on this topic in 
1992. 
Finally, the need for a stronger emphasis 
on international research is clear. In 1992, 
with the creation of the new European 
Community, countries throughout Europe 
will be dropping barriers at their borders, 
expediting the flow of goods and persons. 
Unfortunately, this sweeping change will 
also provide new opportunities for the 
unimpeded movement of illegal drugs and 
illegally obtained currency. As the partici-
pating European countries deal with these 
issues, an unprecedented research opportu-
nity will be created. 
NIJ acknowledges the assistance of the 
Money Laundering Section, Criminal Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice in review-
ing this document. The Money Laundering 
Section, among other responsibilities, in-
vestigates and prosecutes money launder-
ing offenses, and provides advice and guid-
ance to U.S. Attorneys' Offices in money 
laundering litigation and forfeiture actions. 
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